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PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
HOW GOOD DOES A PRODUCT HAVE TO BE?
REED DICKERSON t
INTRODUCTION
As the privity doctrine fades into history, there is little reason for
sorrow. Besides its more obvious shortcomings, the doctrine's almost
hypnotic attractions have long diverted attention from more important
aspects of products liability. One of these is the concept of "legal de-
fect," which is summed up in the question: How good does a product
have to be to satisfy the legal responsibilities of its maker and its dis-
tributors?
The concept of legal defect has matured slowly, partly because of its
subtlety and partly because, with the generally more attractive financial
position of manufacturers, a largely untiiable issue of negligence' has
been forced on the courts by the privity hazards in warranty. Because
under the negligence approach it is necessary, after proof of causation,
only to stigmatize the defendant, the plaintiff has not often needed to
make an independent effort to stigmatize the product. As a result,
product inadequacy has seemed to deserve, and (until recently) has re-
f Professor of Law, Indiana University; author, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD
CONSUMER (1951).
1. Particularly in cases involving slips in manufacture as distinct from cases in-
volving defective design.
What we have been calling liability based on fault in the products cases has
been for the most part strict liability. The reported cases indicate that the
courts have rarely been able to try a bona fide negligence issue in the field of
products liability, particularly in the case of food, because the specific facts
surrounding the defect are rarely known to either party. In practice, if the
plaintiff can persuade the jury that the defect was in the product when it left
the defendant's plant, the inferences are usually drawn in his favor on the
theoretical issue of negligence, with or without an assist from the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur or that of negligence per se. Because this is only paying lip
service to culpability, the privity requirement has probably served only to drive
strict liability into the legal underground.
Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 17 Bus. LAw. 157, 166 (1961), also
published in 16 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 585, 595 (1961), and 468 INs. L.J. 7, 15 (1962).
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ceived, secondary attention.2
Where, on the other hand, the producer can be directly reached in
implied warranty or on some other theory of strict accountability, the
legal framework is different. The courts have not imposed liability
solely on the basis of causation, as some analyses of warranty might
seem to imply; otherwise, the makers of axes would be liable to every
user who accidentally cut himself.' Instead, they have imposed liability
only if, besides causing the plaintiff's injury, the defendant's product
could be considered "legally defective" at the time he sold it.' And so,
although he need not impugn the defendant, the plaintiff must impugn
the product.' It must have failed, at the time of sale, to measure up to
an appropriate standard of performance. The question is: What stand-
ard? With the increasing feasibility and success of warranty or other
strict liability suits against the manufacturer, this question has become
one of the most important in products liability. Only by developing a
coherent legal doctrine of product inadequacy can we effectively imple-
ment our answers to the underlying social question: Who should bear
2. Discussion has been confined for the most part to the last six years. Recent
discussions include Dickerson, supra note 1, at 162-66, 592-96, and 12-15, respectively;
Freedman, "Defect" in the Product-The Necessary Basis for Product Liability in Tort
and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. Rv. 323 (1966) ; James, The Untoward Effects of Cig-
arettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L REv. 1550
(1966) ; Keeton, Products Liability--Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEXAS L. Rtv. 855 (1963) ; Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Ex-
tent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 701; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965) ; Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS § 402A, comments g-k (1965) ; Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harmh,
Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 BOST. COLL. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 285 (1963). For an
earlier discussion, see DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER ch. IV
(1951).
3. "An axe is not necessarily dangerous because, as in negligence law, users would
contemplate the obvious dangers involved." Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
4. E.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 96, 133 N.W.2d 129, 134
(1965) ("he must allege and prove (a) the defect of manufacture upon which he relies,
and (b) injury or damage caused by or resulting from such defect"); Jakubowski v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 199, A.2d 826 (1964). See also Dickerson,
supra note 1, at 163, 592, and 12, respectively; Dickerson, Recent Developments in Food
Products Liability, 8 PRAc. LAw. 17, 26 (1962), also published in 20 J. Mo. BAR 74, 80
(1964) ; Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855, 858 (1963).
5. In a sense, even impugning the product impugns the defendant's conduct.
It is . . . a gross exaggeration to put at opposite poles what represent only
modest differences in degree. On the one hand, even liability for negligence
is a kind of strict liability so far as it holds a person to a general standard of
conduct without regard to his particular idiosyncracies. On the other hand,
strict liability, despite its name, also deals with the defendant's conduct and dif-
fers only in that it substitutes what has been called in other contexts a "per-
formance standard" for a standard that deals with specific conduct.
Dickerson, supra note 1, at 165, 595, and 14, respectively.
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the risk of loss when a commercial product injures its user?
The problem of legal defect has remained partly obscured even in
warranty cases, because in many kinds of situations the existence of a
legal defect may be taken for granted. If the plaintiff has been injured
by a mouse in a soft drink bottle, a stone in a can of beans, or a needle
in a box of crackers, there is little reason to linger over the question of
legal defect. Even with the controversial chicken bone in chicken pie,
where we have something "natural" (as distinct from "foreign") to the
product, courts that have imposed liability have at least had an unwelcome
abnormality to point to. For the most part such cases involve an
occasional slip in manufacture or preparation, where the key to legal
defectiveness is an unexpecfed and often isolated fail-off in quality.'
In many other situations, the marks of legal defectiveness are harder
to see.' This is particularly true of products with allegedly faulty design,
where the offending condition is normal to the product or brand. Before
their engine mounts were redesigned, Lockheed's Electras provided a
dramatic example.'
Until recently, the law has recognized legal defectiveness only by
negative implication from what it has affirmatively demanded. Thus, in
the law of implied warranty of quality, a product has been required to be
"merchantable," fit for any particular purpose that the seller has reason
to know the buyer is relying on him to satisfy, and consistent with any
relied-on representation or promise as to quality. Legal defectiveness
has consisted simply of non-compliance with any of these requirements.
The implied warranty of fitness, which the Uniform Commercial
Code& has restored to its originally intended function as a protection
custom-tailored to special consumer needs,1" sets a variable standard of
6. On the "natural-foreign" test for legal defectiveness, see, for example, Web-
ster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 426, 198 N.E.2d 309, 312 (1964) ("the
occasional presence [of fish bones] . . . in chowders is, it seems to us, to be antici-
pated") ; Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 259, 164 N.E.2d 167, 174 (1960). Cf. Be-
tehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Dicy:asoN, PRoDUcTs
LABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 184 (1951). And see Dickerson, Recent Develop-
nents in Food Products Liability, supra note 4, at 27-28 and 81, respectively.
7. On the other hand, proof of legal defectiveness does not necessarily involve pin-
pointing a specific defect. A simple failure of the product to meet its relevant standards
of performance is enough, if the unspecified offending condition is traceable to the de-
endant's plant. Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d
923 (1951) (failure of fifth-wheel mechanism for hitching tractor to semi-trailer);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 409-10, 161 A.2d 69, 97-99 (1960)
(defective steering mechanism); Amram & Goodman, Some Problems in the Law of
Implied Warranty, 3 SYaACUSE L. REv. 259, 272 (1952).
8. See SEaLING, THE ELECTRA STORY (1963).
9. § 2-315.
10. Under § 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act, the general warranty of merchant-
ability was limited to sales "by description." Courts reluctant to ignore this limitation
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quality with respect to which non-compliance defines a corresponding,
variable measure of legal defectiveness. Similarly for the custom-
tailored protections of express warranty. Beyond this, there is little
opportunity to generalize.
The main concern of this article is the failure of a product to meet
the standardized requirements of quality that the law imposes on behalf
of the consumer in instances where he and the other parties concerned
have not adopted a special standard of performance. In the field of
warranty, this means the breach of the warranty of merchantability.
In the conventional language of implied warranty, the initial ques-
tion has always been: When is a product "not of merchantable quality"
for consumer use? The Uniform Sales Act, unfortunately, did not
define "of merchantable quality," and the Uniform Commercial Code
tells us only that to be qualitatively "merchantable" the goods must be
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." The
key word is "ordinary."
Carefully avoiding the language of warranty, Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts, Second, approaches the problem by setting, instead
of a standard of compliance, a standard of non-compliance and thus an
express, direct standard of legal defectiveness. 1 But for this purpose it
prescribes liability for nothing more specific than "a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer." The key words are "un-
reasonably dangerous.""
Despite these differing approaches, the underlying problem appears
to be the same. Apparently, it makes no material difference whether a
court operates under the common law, the Uniform Sales Act, or the
Uniform Commercial Code, and whether it takes the traditional warranty
approach or the Restatement approach. Thus, a coherent, uniform idea
of "legal defectiveness" that fits comfortably with each of these ap-
proaches, as well as with the principles of negligence," can be developed.
have provided comparable protection in sales other than by description by reading "par-
ticular purpose," in § 15(1), as including the ordinary, general purposes of the product.
11. "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability ... " And see ac-
companying comments h-k.
12. Wade, supra note 2, at 15 n.4, prefers the words "not reasonably safe." Ac-
cording to Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 311, 405 P.2d 624, 629 (1965),
the product must be in an "extrahazardous condition."
Is the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" redundant? Although a
product can be defective without being unreasonably dangerous (e.g., sand in a restaurant
salad), can a product be unreasonably dangerous without being legally defective? Al-
though a good case can be made for saying that it cannot, apparently it was feared that
without the word "defective" some courts might consider a highly dangerous product
(e.g., rotary lawn mower) to be ipso facto unreasonably dangerous.
13. Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions
or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 44-46 (1965).
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Consideration of the reported cases strongly suggests that the factors
defining compliance with minimum standards of consumer use (and,
conversely, the non-compliance inherent in the idea of legal defect) are
closely identified with the normal, reasonable expectation patterns of
buyers and sellers. 4 This is not surprising, because the protection of, or
reluctance to disturb, established patterns of expectation motivates much
of the law. (It explains, for instance, why the courts are reluctant to
apply some statutes retroactively.)
Consideration of the cases also suggests that legally defective prod-
ucts can frustrate reasonable expectations in several ways. Some prod-
ucts disappoint reasonable expectations simply by failing to do what
they are supposed to do (e.g., an automobile steering system that fails
to steer properly). Some products whose functions are aimed at par-
ticular evils disappoint reasonable expectations by causing the very evils
they are designed to prevent (e.g., polio vaccine that causes polio).
Others, while performing their intended functions, disappoint by pro-
ducing unexpected side effects (e.g., thalidomide that, while tranquiliz-
ing, deforms the fetus carried by a pregnant user)."5 Still others disap-
point by failing to cope with foreseeable mishaps, either by lacking feasi-
ble safety devices (e.g., a gun that has no catch) or by not minimizing
partially avoidable consequences (e.g., a car that lacks a collapsible steer-
ing column, shoulder harnesses, or adequate interior padding).
Turning now to the specifics of product disappointment, perhaps we
can illumine general doctrine by looking at typical examples from the
rich and rapidly developing body of case law.
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF THE CONSUMER
In General
The trichinosis cases clearly show the relevance of reasonable con-
sumer expectations in determining whether a product is legally defective. 6
Here the offending entity-trichinella spiralis-is, at least after the fact,
easy to identify. Because the presence of a dangerous parasite might
appear to many courts to be an obvious legal defect, the practical problem
14. This refers, for the most part, to decisions relating to warranty or other strict
products liability actions. In this area, negligence cases must be approached with cau-
tion, not because most of them center on the defendant's conduct rather than on the ade-
quacy of the product, but because the general standards for impugning the defendant
tend to be stricter than those for impugning the product. Thus, although a case that
holds the defendant liable for negligence implies that the product was legally defective,
a case that absolves the defendant of negligence does not necessarily absolve the product.
Some negligence opinions deal expressly with the adequacy of the product.
15. Some side effects, whether expected or unexpected, are justified as being pre-
ferable to the severe consequences of non-use. See notes 83-85 infra.
16. DicKERsoN, PRoDucTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 190-211 (1951).
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has been: What legal rule should the court invoke when it wishes to
avoid finding the defendant liable where it can be assumed that (1) it
was impracticable for the defendant processor to cook the pork to the
thermal death-point of trichinae, and (2) the consumer normally an-
ticipates the danger and cooks the product sufficiently to meet the risk?
In a negligence case, the court may deny recovery on at least two
grounds. It may say that the defendant was not negligent. Or it may
say that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to meet ac-
cepted standards of cookery, an approach that seems unnecessarily in-
direct.'7 In warranty or in other strict liability actions, the corresponding
approach is to say that because, of the way the functions of processing
pork are normally distributed, the product is not legally defective merely
because at the moment of sale it happens to contain an undesirable para-
site. In general, edibility at the moment of sale is not the appropriate
test of wholesomeness. The more reliable test is whether the product is
in such a condition at that time thaf it will be edible after the normal
steps of unpackaging, cleaning, and cooking or other processing have
been taken.
To say that trichinous pork is not legally defective is to assume that
under customary and anticipated methods of cooking pork the tempera-
ture reaches the thermal death-point of 131 degrees. If the assumption
is false, trichinous pork is properly considered legally defective if un-
accompanied by a warning or appropriate cooking instructions." (When
appraising the legal acceptability of a product, we should take account of
the warnings or instructions, if any, that accompany it.)
From these considerations can we derive any test of legal defective-
ness ? At least, we can be sure that to constitute a legal defect the of-
fending condition must be one that the typical consumer of the product
does not anticipate and guard against. " The product must betray his
reasonable, established expectations.
The reasonable expectations of consumers provide a helpful guide,
but a slippery one. If defectiveness depends on the reasonable expecta-
17. There is no point in talking about an affirmative defense when the facts that
support the defense negate the cause of action itself.
18. DIcKEISON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 210; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §
402A, comment h (1965).
19. Consumer knowledge of the risk is a necessary element also in the defense of
assumption of risk. The two concepts are compared in Keeton, Assumption of Prodiut
Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 73-75 (1965). See also Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products
Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85-86
(D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962). The Uniform Commercial Code
recognizes assumption of risk but does not apply it under that name. Reasonably dis-
coverable shortcomings are simply not covered by implied warranty. See § 2-316(3) (b)
and comment 8. Cf. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15(3).
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tions of particular classes of consumers, how can we measure those ex-
pectations? How, for instance, can we measure the expectations of the
normal housewife as to whether and how fully particular pork products
need to be cooked? Consumer expectations are as subtle as perceived
meanings; both depend on the particular environments in which they
operate. Fortunately, problems of this kind are common grist for the
courts, and a judgment as to the reasonable expectations for a particular
product is no harder to make than the lexicographical judgment as to
what a particular phrase normally means in a particular speech communi-
ty. It is a familiar exercise in judicial empathy.
The most troublesome situations are those in which consumer at-
titudes have not sufficiently crystallized to define an expected standard
of performance. What, for instance, should the law do about tractors
that overturn, surgical implants that break, and rear-engined automobiles
that tend to swerve at high speeds? These are products that tend to
involve allegedly faulty design."0 If it is not feasible to improve the
product's performance or to provide a safety device for situations in
which the consumer appears to be undesirably vulnerable,2 the answer
may lie in requiring appropriate warnings or instructions for use.2
Although there is a tendency in such cases to refer to a "duty to
warn" or "duty to provide a safety device" as if they were independent
duties, it seems preferable to approach these "duties" as alternative means
of discharging a single, broader duty to provide, under prescribed condi-
tions, a product that does not violate the consumer's normal expectations
by exposing him to an unreasonable and concealed danger. The "duty to
20. On design defects generally, and subject to the warning in note 14 supra, see
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 91 (1961); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Direc-
tions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Noel, supra note 13; Noel, Mani-
facturer's Liability for Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REv. 433, 453-58 (1966).
21. Subject to the warning in note 14 supra, see Noel, Manufacturer's Liability for
Negligence, supra note 20, at 454-57. The law on safety devices has hardly begun to jell.
Although the rationale of this article would tend to support the general view that
a safety device (like a warning) is required only with respect to latent conditions, sev-
eral cases have suggested that an unreasonably dangerous condition may exist even with
respect to defects that are not latent. See Iacurci v. Lummus Co., 340 F.2d 868, 872
(2d Cir. 1965); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 73-75, 215 N.E.2d
465, 467 (1966).
22. R.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 522
(1965) (dynamite with fast fuse) ; Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac.
945 (1926) (tractor). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1929)
(tractor). On warnings and directions for use generally, see Annot. 76 A.L.R.2d 9
(1961) ; FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 (1965) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS, § 402A, comment 1 (1965) ; Dillard & Hart, Products Liability: Directions for
Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955) ; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE I.. 816 (1962) ; Noel, Recent
Trends in, Manufacturer's Negligence as to Design, Instructions, or Warnings, 19 Sw.
L.J. 43 (1965).
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warn" is thus a duty only in the sense that in particular circumstances a
warning may be the most feasible alternative.
Contemplated Use
Consumer expectations normally relate to contemplated, generally
accepted uses. With food, the problem of contemplated use is slight,
because food is to eat, and once we have said that there is little more to
tell. The same is true of other single-use products, such as electric
toothbrushes. Even so, it is sometimes hard to tell whether the partic-
ular use to which the injured plaintiff was putting the product was a
contemplated one and thus one with respect to which his expectations
may be said to be "reasonable."
In a case recently litigated in Indiana, the plaintiff used a cheap
hammer to drive a case-hardened nail into a concrete wall. The face of
the hammer chipped and the fragment destroyed the sight of one of his
eyes. Was this a contemplated use, such that it could be said that the
hammer was legally defective because it failed to meet the reasonable
expectations of the user with respect to that use? This problem is often
stated in terms of "misuse," a term that tends to confuse the problem of
non-contemplated use with that of contributory negligence, which it
overlaps.2"
The difference between non-contemplated use and contributory
negligence is easily illustrated. Suppose that, having no other implement,
a camper gently uses a screw driver to pry the lid from a tin of tobacco.
The screw driver snaps and a piece pierces his eye. The plaintiff camper
has not been negligent or assumed the risk, because he has often used a
screw driver for simple prying purposes and he has been careful on this
occasion. Even so, he will be defeated by his own conduct if this kind
of use was significantly abnormal. Product adequacy does not mean
adequacy for every purpose.
In trying to refute the charge of defectiveness, the defendant would
undoubtedly argue that the purpose of a screw driver is to insert or with-
draw screws, and that, if a product that is designed for one purpose is
23. The court in Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965),
apparently felt that abnormal, careless use should be treated as contributory negligence,
even in a warranty suit. Cf. Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 729, 151
N.E.2d 263, 265 (1958) ("glass jars are not sold, or bought, in the expectation that they
will be subjected to pressures which may be developed by using as a lever, in the man-
ner described, a tool designed to make holes in metal cans"). See also Strahlendorf v.
Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 830 (1962). A doctrine of non-
contemplated use is necessary, in warranty cases, to bar the non-careless plaintiff. Swain
v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1964). Because the same doctrine
also takes care of the careless plaintiff, the doctrine of contributory negligence would
seem to be unnecessary in warranty or other strict liability cases.
308
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used for another, his responsibility ends. But to say that a screw driver
may be used only to drive screws is to be bewitched by names. Should
not the seller be held accountable for the secondary uses to which his
product is likely to be put by the resourceful, yet reasonable, user? A
chair, for example, should be safe for standing on as well as sitting in.2"
And, if common practice is a reliable guide, a screw driver should be safe
for simple prying purposes."
The defendant might seek comfort in Mannsz v. MacWhyte,2  in
which the decedent had lost his life when a wire rope made by the de-
fendant and marketed as a special-purpose rope broke while being used
to support a scaffold. Although the use was different from the adver-
tised one, the weight that it failed to sustain was well below the maximum
sustaining weight that the defendant expressly undertook to provide.
In such a case it would be easy to say that the contemplated use was
simply that stated by the manufacturer:
[Our rope] is used as a hand rope in connection with the op-
erating device of . . . elevators, as steering cable on small
boats and steamers, and for industrial and mining devices.27
On such a basis, the plaintiff would automatically lose, as he did in that
case. The court treated the problem mainly as one of express warranty
and found that the decedent's use did not come within if.
However, an express warranty does not necessarily exclude an im-
plied one, and the fact that a device has a primary use does not necessarily
imply that it has no secondary ones. The term "contemplated use" would
seem to include every kind of use to which the consumer customarily puts
the product. This is clear in the toy cases, where manufacturers have
been held responsible for toxic ingredients in toys that were designed for
non-oral uses but that children commonly put in their mouths."
24. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 235 P.2d
857, 759 (1951).
25. A leading distributor of gift cartons of fruit prints this on the ends of each
carton: "To open pry up staples by inserting screwdriver or similar tool under them."
26. 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
27. Id. at 448. 'In warranting his product for use in "all normal flight maneuvers,"
does the aircraft manufacturer impliedly warn against all use under abnormal flying
conditions?
28. E.g, in Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir.
1931), a 3-year-old child died from eating a "spit devil" firework that he had bought
from a retailer. In a suit for negligence, the manufacturer unsuccessfully contended
that the product had been used other than for its intended purpose. In Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962), the defendant manufacturer was held
liable for negligence where the infant decedent had succumbed from drinking its furni-
ture polish. In Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d
681, 691 (1964) (child used hair spray as if it were perfume), the court said, "The ques-
tion of what is an ordinary use . . . is clearly one of fact."
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The special question raised by the Mannsz case is: How far can the
manufacturer, through accompanying statements, narrow the reasonable
expectations for use that might otherwise exist? May a manufacturer
thereby limit the range of contemplated use and thus the scope of his
legal responsibility?" Mere directions for use may not be effective for
this purpose."0 At this point we encounter aspects of the warning and
perhaps even aspects of the disclaimer.
When the manufacturer of rope says that it is useful for manipu-
lating elevators and boats, is he impliedly warning the buyer that it is
unsafe for supporting a scaffold, even if the scaffold weighs significantly
less than the maximum weight capacity represented by the manufacturer ?"'
Is this how the normal user would read such a statement? Or would he
read it as implying only a disclaimer? The difference between an effec-
29. A currently marketed product called "Mark II The Champagne of After
Shower Cologne," -bottled and packaged as if it were wine, carries this message on the
back of the bottle: "Caution: This is not a beverage. Do not take internally. This is
a toiletries product." Is there a difference between letting the manufacturer define the
product and letting him define the range of contemplated uses?
Suppose that the MacPherson wheel was typical of Buick wheels generally, and
that, though made of second-quality material, it was strong enough for use at
low speeds on smooth roads, though dangerous at high speeds on rough roads.
Assume that the manufacturer is trying to make his product to a price, and
that he advertises his cars as safe for normal use but cautions purchasers against
abuse. He frankly represents his product as one intended for cheap service
under optimum conditions, even though he can and should foresee that some
purchasers will drive at high speeds on rough roads. The car is skillfully de-
signed within its planned limitations, and the wheel meets its specifications.
Nevertheless the wheel collapses, injuring the driver, who is using the car in a
foreseeable way. Is the manufacturer liable? He certainly can argue that, if
the wheel is as good as it was intended to be, it was not "defective" in the sense
that it was atypical, that it fell short of the applicable predetermined standards
of quality.
GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 104-05 (1960). In Lovejoy
v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956), the
court held in favor of the plaintiff in a negligence action even though he was driving
the offending tractor in low gear faster than the maximum speed of 2.3 miles per hour
specified in the manufacturer's instructions.
30. E.g., in Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930),
the court held, in a negligence suit, that instructions on the container that the defendant's
inflammable combs were not designed to be used for the dressing of hair together with
a machine that was designed to produce heat did not absolve him from liability for fail-
ing to warn the user of fire, even though the plaintiff's hairdresser disregarded that
instruction. In McClanahan v. California Spray Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 853, 75
S.E.2d 712, 718 (1953), the court said that "the fact that directions are overlooked or
are not meticulously followed does not relieve a manufacturer of the duty to warn of
the latent danger common to a class of articles." See Dillard & Hart, supra note 22, at
162. Thus, directions for use may be ineffective to limit contemplated use, at least
where the seller has reason to believe that the normal consumer will tend to disregard
them.
31. If through the warranty of fitness the law allows the consumer-buyer to define
the contemplated uses of the product by communicating his special purpose, should it not
allow the seller similarly to define its contemplated uses by an appropriate communica-
tion?
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tive legal warning 2 and a mere disclaimer" is that by the former the
seller sufficiently educates the consumer that he may be expected to
protect himself, whereas by the laffer (which has no informational value)
the seller seeks only to escape a liability that would otherwise attach.
This is probably why courts are more likely to give effect to a warning.
If in the Mamnisz case weight had been the only problem, there would
have been little basis for implying a warning. A hemp rope capable of
sustaining a weight of almost 2,000 pounds of elevator should be able to
sustain a weight of 650 pounds of scaffold and men. On the other hand,
the fact that the rope was made of wire may well have implied a warning
against uses involving crimping, kinking, or other sharp folding, risks
to which wire ropes are presumably more susceptible. Use of it to sup-
port a scaffold may well entail risks unknown to elevators, marine steer-
ing equipment, and other uses in which the rope is protected from sig-
nificant bending by the contours of a wheel. The court stressed the
difference between dead loads and live loads, with the latter's "ever-
shifting tensions and strains."" At the same time, it indicated that the
result might have been different had the decedent's use been one "an-
alogous to those specified" by the defendant.8 5
In any event, if a court allows the seller to limit his responsibility
for minimum satisfactory performance by means other than effective
directions for use or an actual (though not necessarily express) warning,
it is giving effect to what amounts to an implied disclaimer in a situation
in which even an express disclaimer should be suspect.
Although a disclaimer is unlikely to be held effective in situations
involving an imbalance of bargaining power86 unless it contains the sub-
stance of an effective warning, directions for use may be effective in
discharging the seller's general duty not to market a defective product,
even apart from a warning, if they effectively channel users of the kind
in question into a use and manner of use of the product that eliminates
or minimizes the risk. Unfortunately, for many products it may be
difficult or impossible to write instructions that accomplish that result.
The area in which instructions for use may be effective independently of
warning may, therefore, remain narrow.
32. On warnings generally, see note 22 supra.
33. On disclaimers generally, see Comment, Disclainers of Warranty in Consumer
Sales, 77 HARv. L. REv. 318 (1963) ; Comment, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation of
Remedy for Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. REv.
396 (1963).
34. 155 F.2d at 451.
35. Ibid.
36. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960).
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So far, we have discussed mainly the kind of multiple-use product
that has a primary use and peripheral uses that either fall into established
patterns or are such that they may be expected to suggest themselves to
the resourceful, yet careful, user. If holding the maker responsible for
the latter kind of use seems too onerous, remember that the maker can
usually protect himself by an appropriate warning or instruction.
The appropriateness of the "contemplated use" requirement is also
suggested by multi-purpose products such as hemp rope, ladders, and "all
purpose" wire. What are the contemplated uses of a hemp rope? Such
a question is not readily answered, and yet the general principle seems
dear. The performance standards that define legal defectiveness neces-
sarily depend on the established, recognizable expectations of consumer
use. As in many other places in the law, the preservation of reasonable
expectations seems to be a controlling legal objective. The practical
problem is to define these expectations in particular kinds of cases.
Problems arise even with products that have been put only to their
intended general use. The hula skirt involved in Chapman v. Brow 3
was sold to a woman who lent it to her diminutive niece to wear to a
party. Did the fact that the skirt reached the floor when the shorter
woman sat down and thereby touched a lighted cigarette butt mean that
the use fell outside the contemplated use and manner of use of this size
skirt? The court thought not. Contemplated manner of use would seem
to rest on the same basis as contemplated use.
Although the patterns of consumer expectations may be general and
vague, they give a sense of direction in an area of the law where the
deceptive simplicity of the fact situations tends to obscure the subtleties
of legal doctrine.
Contemplated Level of Performance
With respect to a contemplated use and manner of use of a product,
consumer expectations also develop as to levels of performance. What
is a product's minimum acceptable performance?
The problems of practical application are almost unlimited. How
long, for instance, should an abrasive wheel last?" And consider new
automobiles."9  How much "fish tailing" is normal at high speeds?4"
37. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961).
38. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 186, 199 A.2d 826, 831
(1964) (possible mis-use or over-use). The problem of over-use was also involved in
Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1965).
39. On automobiles generally, see GILLAM, op. cit. supra note 29, at 103-42.
40. Some cases . . .involve an allegation that the Corvair, in the 1959 through
1963 models, involves an unsafe design. In these cases it is alleged that the
automobile becomes unstable at times because its engine is placed so far to the
back of the car that sixty-three per cent of the automobile's weight is concen-
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Is a car's tendency to lurch when put in reverse a legal defect? 1  In
-general, what are the normal consumer expecfations that ought to be
protected with respect to matters of automobile design? 2
Assuming the minimum normal inspection and maintenance, how
long is an automobile safe to drive? How long is the steering apparatus,
which receives only occasional attention, supposed to operate? Fortun-
ately for the plaintiffs in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,"' the
car that injured the buyer's wife had been used for only 10 days after
purchase. Suppose, instead, that it had been used for 10 months or 10
years.4 ' Would the result have been different in such a case, if the car
had had only "normal" use and had been properly serviced? A similar
problem arises for automobile tires. 5
A question likely to be increasingly important is the extent, if any,
to which the automobile consumer has legally protectable expectations in
the event of an accident. If the manufacturer has represented that the
roof is seamless, he must make good to the consumer whose head is cut
by a jagged seam."8  But suppose there is no express undertaking. In
Evans v. Geieral Motors Corp.,"7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the manufacturer had no duty to replace
its X frame with a perimeter frame, which gives better protection against
an impact from the side.
Although there is some tendency to discuss such cases in the context
of non-contemplated use, automobile accidents are a generally foreseeable
trated over the rear end. It is claimed that in a considerable number of acci-
dents the car tended to oversteer, with the result that the rear started to swing
sideways, causing the driver to lose control and crash.
Noel, supra note 13, at 59. Collins v. General Motors Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County 1965), described in 14 DEF. LJ. 556 (1965). See also Comment, The Corvair
and the Law: The Legal Implications of a Design Defect, 3 HOUSTON L. REv. 233
(1965).
41. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963).
42. GILLAM, op. cit. supra note 29, at 104-10.
43. See note 7 supra.
44. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964), in-
volving a brake failure, the vehicle was 6 weeks old and had gone 1,500 miles.
45. How far may a particular kind of tire be expected to go under safe driving
conditions before a blowout may well be expected? In Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,
344 F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1965), the court refused to rule that a truck tire that had
gone 75,000 miles without rotation was, as a matter of law, beyond the protection of im-
plied warranty.
What are the consumer's reasonable expectations, if any, in tolerance areas? If an
aircraft manufacturer, after testing the structural limits of a plane, posts a conserva-
tive g load of two-fifths of the estimated maximum load (a rough, general practice),
how large a g load, if any, above the posted load may a pilot rely on in unusual weather
conditions before he exceeds the limit of contemplated level of performance?
46. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
47. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). This case is dis-
cussed in detail in Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an "Unworthy" Autonwbile, 52
Coanrx.L L.Q. 444 (1967).
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incident to normal use. It seems more appropriate to ask whether the
consumer has definable expectations respecting quality of performance
under conditions that he does not normally contemplate. Conceivably,
these expectations could extend to such matters as appropriate padding,
the absence of needless projections, doors that stay shut, and collapsible
steering columns. And yet, in the absence of special assurances, how can
the consumer be said to expect what it has not been customary for the
manufacturer to provide? As it was with safety glass, it seems logical
to conclude that consumer expectations will lag behind actual practices,
and that the further extension of safety practices designed to minimize
the consequences of accidents will depend either on direct regulation or
on the development of a broader rationale of seller responsibility. This
means that one is not limited to protecting the existing consumer expecta-
tions inherent in the concept of reliance, which underlies the seller's cur-
rent civil obligations as to the quality of the goods he sells."8
Although the case law is sparse, it is interesting to speculate on the
liabilities attaching to the seller of used goods. Are all used goods sid
generis as against the immediate seller, with the result that the consumer
is unprotected except by express warranty and the principles of negli-
gence.' 9 If not, what are the normal, reasonable expectations of the
buyer of a used car respecting, for example, its brakes? That they will
perform "for a reasonable time?" That they will perform only long
enough to get him off the used-car lot?" Beyond express warranty or
warning, should it make a difference whether the seller has only a used-
car lot, without repair facilities, or operates a new car agency at which
he receives used cars in trade? Do normal consumer expectations en-
visage the dealer's inspection or repair? Should it make a difference that
the dealer has partly reconditioned the car?
Determining and describing the patterns of consumer expectation
become even more elusive when we move from the specialist in used
48. Although reliance is not expressly written into the warranty of merchantability,
it seems to inhere in most sales by a merchant to a consumer.
49. This position was apparently taken by Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d
801 (1950) (defective automobile brakes); Armour v. Haskins, 275 S.W.2d 580 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1955) (defective automobile brakes); Swensson v. New York, Albany Des-
patch Co., 309 N.Y. 497, 131 N.E.2d 902 (1956) (defective tractor brakes) ; Driver v.
Snow, 245 N.C. 223, 95 S.E.2d 519 (1956) (exploding stove) ; Holley v. Central Auto
Parts, 347 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (wheel rim) ; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick,
196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1929) (defective automobile brakes). UNIFORM CoMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 3, says, "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, how-
ever, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is their con-
tract description." What this portends is hard to say.
50. In Bari v. Kutner, supra note 49, the brakes failed about two hours after pur-
chase. In Armour v. Haskins, supra note 49, the brakes locked on the maiden trip after
purchase.
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goods, such as the used-car dealer (on whom the consumer-buyer is more
likely to rely), to the non-specialist, such as the antique dealer or the
pawnbroker who realizes on his security. What are the normal expecta-
tions of the purchaser of an antique rocking chair? That he can safely
rock in it for a short time? Or only that he has something interesting
to look at and talk about? In view of the relatively unattractive financial
position of most of these sellers, questions such as these are likely to be
only rarely litigated. Still, it is interesting to speculate, and the effort
may even illumine problems more likely to arise.
Reconditioned goods lie somewhere between new goods and used
goods. How long should recapped tires operate without blowing or
throwing their treads?"' What are the responsibilities of such enter-
prises as the Good Will Industries respecting the quality of the goods
they sell? Here, the reconditioner assumes a limited role as manufacturer.
Although the specifics of consumer expectation may differ, the general
principles would seem to be the same.
As against the original manufacturer of the used goods, does an
unreasonably dangerous condition in the original product lose its char-
acter as a legal defect merely because the product has already been used
by others, or is the special problem only the practical one of tracing the
defect to its source? The latter would seem to make the greater sense.
There are other problems. Dean Keeton asked recently whether a
product should be considered as "legally defective" when it is one that
the consumer would buy and use even knowing of the risk."2 The
answer would seem to be that "it depends."
If the article is inherently dangerous, like a shotgun or chain saw,
there is little reason to say that the product is legally defective. Is a gun
necessarily defective because the user accidentally -hoots himself ? Here
the consumer assumes the primary burden of protecting himself. On the
other hand, suppose that the consumer of a soft drink knows that no
manufacturing or bottling process is perfect and that in a small percent-
age of cases foreign objects get into soft drink bottles. Is this the kind
of knowledge that should disqualify him if he swallows broken glass?
Clearly not. In the former instance, the consumer's knowledge relates to
the specific article that he bought. In the latter, it relates to the product
generally and only contingently to the specific article. The known risk
is so sporadic and remote that the prudent consumer who wants to lead a
51. See Burke v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 319 Mass. 372, 65 N.E.2d 917 (1946).
52. Keeton, supra note 4, at 871.
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normal, sensible life necessarily ignores it." Despite his knowledge, he
properly relies on the manufacturer to protect him. The product is
legally defective. The "reasonableness" of a consumer expectation,
therefore, may depend on whether the offending condition relates only
contingently to the specific article or inheres in it.
How should we treat risks such as Judge Goodrich listed in his con-
curring opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. ?"4 Is
whiskey legally defective for consumers who spoil their livers with too
much of it? Are salted peanuts and butter legally defective for a con-
sumer who has a cholesterol problem? The obvious answer is no. But
why?
Bypassing the obvious approaches of assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence, we may plausibly say that whiskey, peanuts, and
butter are not legally defective, because excessive use is the kind of mis-
use or non-contemplated use that falls beyond the range of reasonable
consumer expectations." For the special class of those who must avoid
salt, we can say that the product is not legally defective, if to meet the re-
quirements of the Federal Food and Drug Administration the seller in-
cludes a statement on the label that the product contains salt. This is the
only kind of warning that is both feasible and helpful to the consumer.
Although he is a member of a known and defined class, there is no prac-
ticable way in which the seller could know and tell him that he is vulner-
able to salt. Once the consumer learns of his weakness from his physi-
cian he can protect himself by taking the trouble to read the labels on
products.
Vicarious Expectations
Sometimes it seems appropriate to protect, not the reasonable expec-
tations of the consumer himself, but those of a person charged with rep-
resenting or protecting him in the selection or use of the product.
The most obvious example is a person under a physician's care. For
drugs administered or prescribed by the physician, the relevant expecta-
tions would appear to be the physician's rather than the patient's.56 Al-
53. Knowledge of risk is not necessarily "assumption of risk." Keeton, supra note
19, at 66-72. This may keep some warnings from being effective. And see notes 83-85
infra.
54. 295 F.2d 292, 303 (3d Cir. 1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §
402A, comment i (1965).
55. Some of the relevant considerations here are discussed in James, supra note 2,
at 1552-55.
56. E.g., Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 394, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 192 (1964)
(chloromycetin). "What is peculiar about a drug product is that while the product is
intended for the patient-consumer, the pitch is rarely if ever made to him, but rather is
directed toward the doctor in order to influence him to prescribe one brand or class of
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though we might even say, in such a case, that the person who adminis-
ters the product is the "consumer," it would probably be more plausible to
assume that for this purpose the physician acts as agent for the con-
sumer."7  Similarly, an employer may receive a warning on behalf of his
employee.5
8
A comparable situation exists with potentially dangerous toys. In
Crist v. Art Metal Works," the representation that a toy spark pistol was
"absolutely harmless" was obviously directed to the parent rather than to
the infant son, who while playing with it set fire to his play clothes. In
many cases a written warning should be directed to the purchasing parent
rather than to the child, and the seller should be able to rely on the parent
either to convey the warning orally to the child or to take other appropri-
ate precautions."0
For the same reason, if a risk is already known to the child's parents
and is one that they would customarily guard against, the product is not
defective merely because the same risk is inadequately appreciated by the
child.
Special Consumer Expectations
Legal defectiveness may be a function not only of the condition of
the product but also of the kind of purchaser. Although a shotgun is
ordinarily an acceptable product in the eyes of the law when it is sold to
a mature purchaser, might we not treat it as "legally defective" when it
is sold to a person of tender years? As against the retailer, of course,
the point is academic because he is clearly negligent in selling the weapon
to a child and thus liable regardless of the defectiveness of the product.6'
Suppose that a manufacturer markets a game that would be accept-
able in the hands of a 16-year-old but would be latently dangerous in the
hands of an 8-year-old, and that he includes no warning on the package.
Suppose, also, that the retailer sells the product directly to an 8-year-old,
and that the child is injured. 2 In the absence of an appropriate warning,
it would seem plausible to consider the product as legally defective, even
medicine over another." Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufac-
turer's Liability, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 947, 976 (1964).
57. Ibid.
58. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 347, 246 Pac. 945, 947 (1926).
59. 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1930).
60. See Morris v. The Toy Box, 204 Cal. App. 2d 468, 473, 22 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575
(1962): "To us it is simply inconceivable that a 10-year-old boy, vauch less his mother,
would be unacquainted with the use of so common an article as the one here in question'
(bow and arrow). (Emphasis added.)
61. Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 427 (1882).
62. This was essentially the situation in Pitts v. Basile, 55 Ill. App. 2d 37, 204
N.E.2d 43 (1965) (dart injured eye of playmate). However, the suit was in negligence
and brought by a bystander.
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in the hands of an innocent retailer, and even though in the different con-
text of a sale to an older child or adult it would be entirely acceptable.
Special consumer expectations may relate not only to the manner of
use but to the kinds of use to which the product may legitimately be put.
Thus, many products intended for other uses by young children should
be expected also to be put in the mouth."
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF THE SELLER
In General
So far, we have considered the normal, reasonable expectations of
the consumer. What about the normal, reasonable expectations of the
manufacturer or other seller? Should these, too, be considered in defin-
ing legal defectiveness?
Normally, we can assume that the consumer's expectations are
shared, for the most part, by the manufacturer. However, in McCready
v. United Iron & Steel Co.,64 the plaintiff administrator was denied re-
covery because the decedent workman's use of the cross bar of a steel
window casement to support himself in some unknown manner was not
a "normal use." Although there was testimony that "it was common
practice of iron and steel workmen to go up and down on casements be-
cause it was cheaper and faster for the contractor," there was no show-
ing that the defendant had reason to know that casement cross bars were
being so used. This was enough to defeat a suit in negligence. We can
only speculate as to what the court would have decided had the suit been
one in warranty. Although steel casements are not designed as ladders,
they are commonly used for this purpose. Because in this instance there
had been only a tack weld at one end of the offending cross bar, there
was some basis for labeling the product as legally defective independently
of this particular failure.
In general, a court may be reluctant to impose legal responsibility on
the producer for satisfying the reasonable expectations of the consumer
with respect to a particular use, unless the producer has had reason to
know that the use exists."5
63. See note 28 supra.
64. 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
65. Despite the warning in note 14 supra, no reason for distinguishing implied war-
ranty from negligence appears with respect to the narrow question of the foreseeability
by the reasonable seller of the reasonable consumer's use and manner of use. See Simp-
son Timber Co. v. Parks, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2339 (9th Cir. 1965). Accordingly, Noel
supra note 21, at 856-66, seems fully relevant here.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Seller's Knowledge of the Role Attributed to Him
Also, a court may be reluctant to impose legal responsibility on the
producer for satisfying the reasonable expectations of the consumer un-
less the producer has knowingly participated in generating those expec-
tations in the way attributed to him by the consumer.
The point is well illustrated in Schneider v. Suhrmann,8 in which
the Utah Supreme Court absolved the alleged processor of mettwurst
sausage from responsibility for the plaintiff's trichinosis, because the
processor had made a good-faith arrangement whereby the retailer under-
took to complete the processing of the product. (The retailer did not do
so.) Although the product that injured the plaintiff was the identical
product that the defendant had sold, it seemed unfair to hold him liable
for having sold something called "mettwurst" when under the circum-
stances he was reasonable in thinking that all he had sold were ingredients
for mettwurst to be processed by another.
Even though the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff consumer
respecting the quality of the product were unaffected by any private ar-
rangement between the first processor and the processing retailer, -it
would seem undesirable to hold the former to the responsibilities of a fi-
nal processor unless he knowingly assumed that role with respect to the
product in question. Indeed, to protect the consumer's reasonable expec-
tations without regard to the defendant's knowledge or opportunity for
knowledge of the role attributed to him would call for imposing liability
even where someone had stolen the incompleted mettwurst from his plant
and introduced it into the channels of trade. Under the approach of
the Suhrnwzn case, on the other hand, such an arrangement as the parties
entered into would expose the processor to liability only if he had had
reason to believe that the retailer was unreliable or that the consumer
was otherwise being unreasonably exposed to danger."7 Adequate con-
summer protection does not require that the law attribute to a seller in all
cases the role that he has voluntarily assumed, or represented that he has
assumed, only in most cases.
A similar situation arose in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,6" where
the New Jersey Supreme Court absolved the manufacturer of a gas-fired
boiler both of negligence and of warranty or strict responsibility for the
scalding of an infant who was using a bathroom washstand. The manu-
66. 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). And see Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
67. Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959), in-
volving a defective rocking chair, presents the same problem in the context of negligence.
68. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
facturer had recommended the use of mixing valves, but the seller-
contractor relied, instead, on combination spigots supplemented by inade-
quate instructions to his customers. Although without mixing valves
the boilers were legally defective as sold by the contractor, they were not
legally defective as sold by the manufacturer, because the contractor was
an experienced builder and the manufacturer had no way of knowing
that the contractor would not adopt the recommendation by obtaining
valves from another source. Although, again, the unreasonably dangerous
product that injured the plaintiff was the identical product that the man-
ufacturer had sold, in neither case was it unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer when the manufacturer sold it. The court found that he had
properly relied on the contractor to complete an otherwise incomplete
heating unit."
The positions taken in the Suhrmann and Schipper cases seem con-
sistent with Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, where
liability for defective products depends on whether the defect makes the
product "unreasonably dangerous" to the user."0 Mere danger is not
enough, and fhe word "unreasonably"71 might well take into account not
only the degree of danger but the circumstances that create it. The mat-
ter will be discussed further in connection with allergies.
In interesting contrast to Schneider v. Suhrmann and Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc. is Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,"' in which the
buyer of an automobile and his sister were seriously injured when the
piston in the master brake cylinder failed. The manufacturer of the
automobile was held strictly responsible even though the retail dealer
had failed to make adjustments, agreed on by him and the manufacturer,
that would have avoided or removed the offending condition. The
court said that the rules of strict liability
apply regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the
manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties. It appears
in the present case that Ford delegates the final steps in that
process to its authorized dealers. It does not deliver cars to its
dealers that are ready to be driven away by the ultimate pur-
chasers but relies on its dealers to make the final inspections,
69. Id. at 97, 207 A.2d at 329.
70. See comment i.
71. Although the term is more helpfully descriptive, it is almost as hard to deter-
mine what is "unreasonably dangerous" as it is to determine what is "legally defective."
Thus, it may be more helpful as a restatement of the problem than it is as a solution.
In this context, "reasonableness" requires significantly more than mere conformity with
accepted patterns of seller conduct, the conventional negligence test.
72. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
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corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the cars ready
for use. Since Ford, as the manufacturer of the completed
product, cannot delegate its duty to have its cars delivered to the
ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects, it cannot escape
liability on the ground that the defect in Vandermark's car may
have been caused by something one of its authorized dealers did
or failed to do.
7 1
But is it accurate to say that a manufacturer may not "delegate" the
duty of having his "cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from
dangerous defects"? Unless the dealer was the manufacturer's agent
for this purpose, so sweeping a generalization seems inconsistent with
the principle that the manufacturer of a product is normally not respons-
ible for slips in the operations of later buyers and users unless he has
exposed the consumer unreasonably to the risk. This principle clearly
extends to inherently dangerous articles such as explosives and straight-
edged razors, component parts, and products requiring later processing
or reprocessing. Certainly a voluntary allocation of processing, assem-
bling, or protective functions between otherwise unaffiliated sellers and
users does not automatically implicate each seller in the operations of
later handlers.
The court's statement is no less questionable for being couched in
terms of dangerous "defects" rather than dangerous "conditions." A
car is not legally defective when the manufacturer sells it merely because
it may become so by the time the dealer resells it, any more than un-
processed pork is legally defective when the producer sells it to a restau-
rant merely because the restaurateur fails to cook it properly. So far as
the ambiguous phrase "free from dangerous defects" refers only to the
condition of the product when sold by an independent retail dealer, the
statement is not true. So far as it refers to the condition of the product
when the manufacturer sold it to an independent retail dealer, it begs the
question whether the car was legally defective at the time of that sale.
Assuming that the court may have been influenced by the fact that
the uncorrected condition came into existence at the factory, we might
speculate, in view of the court's sweeping language, on how it would
have held had the braking system been installed in the first instance by
the dealer or had the defect consisted of a dangerous braking condition
created by him. Should liability depend on when the offending condition
(as distinct from the taint of legal defectiveness) came into existence?
In Schneider v. Suhrmann, the first processor was absolved even though
73. Id. at 171.
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the offending condition existed before he acquired the pork ingredients.
The Vandermark opinion makes legal sense only if the manufac-
turer's arrangement with its dealers put them under its supervisory thumb,
if the manufacturer represented itself to the consuming public as a final
processor, or if some element in the arrangement unreasonably exposed
the consumer to physical risk. Schneider v. Suhrmann, and Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., too, must stand or fall by this test.
By its language of "delegation," the court in the Vandermark case
suggested that liability rested on an agency-like relationship in which the
manufacturer retained enough supervisory control to warrant the impo-
sition of vicarious liability. Was there an agency there? Did the spe-
cifics of the dealership contract take the retail dealer out of the class of
independent contractor? The court did not say. However, the general
pattern of automobile manufacturer-dealership arrangements suggests
that this was probably the case. 4 Besides, the manufacturer may well
have represented itself to the consuming public as assuming the role of
final processor in all respects. In either case, the Vandermark case is dis-
tinguishable from the Suhrnman. and Schipper cases and is thus consistent
with the broad principle, stated above, for which the latter cases are be-
lieved to stand.
Knowledge of the Risk
To be responsible on the ground that his product is "legally defec-
tive," how much knowledge must a manufacturer have in addition to
some knowledge or opportunity for knowledge about the use to which the
plaintiff consumer was putting his product when he was injured? How
much, if any, must the manufacturer know about the level of perform-
ance that the consumer expects of his product or, conversely, the inci-
74. The dealer also plays an important role in the manufacturing process itself.
[I]t is not at all unusual for the dealer's role in the manufacturing process to
go so far as the extensive disassembly and correct reassembly of engines and
other complex units. Probably a substantial proportion of new cars could not
safely or satisfactorily be delivered in the condition in which they leave the
factory.
[There is] in the automobile industry a manufacturer-dealer relationship so in-
timate as to raise some question concerning the economic, as distinguished from
the legal, genuineness of the dealer's independence. Manufacturers have suc-
ceeded in drafting their dealership contracts in such a way as to avoid legal
entanglements of an agency relationship while nevertheless maintaining a very
substantial degree of control over the dealer organization. Often this control
is so extensive as to suggest that an economic reality, if not in legal theory, the
dealer is the manufacturer's alter ego.
GILLAM, op. cit. supra note 29, at 12-13, 16. See also Milling, Henningsen and the Pre-
delivery Inspection and Conditioning Schedule, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 559 (1962).
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dence of harm that it might be expected to produce? By "knowledge,"
we mean the knowledge, not of the particular manufacturer, but of manu-
facturers of that kind of product generally.
A recent Florida case seems to hold that the seller's state of mind
may be ignored. In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,7 the Florida Su-
preme Court, replying to a question certified to it by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held that under Florida law a
manufacturer's knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of the defective
or unwholesome condition of its cigarettes is irrelevant to its liability in
implied warranty for resulting cancer.
It should surprise few lawyers that, once causation and a legal defect
are established, liability in warranty follows as a matter of course, unless
the defendant can develop an affirmative defense such as assumption of
risk. The more interesting legal issue is whether the manufacturer's
knowledge or reasonable opportunity for knowledge might under some
circumstances be considered an element of legal defectiveness itself. This
issue was apparently foreclosed by the court's disclaimer of any concern
with the issue of merchantability or the scope of the warranty.
Although later in the opinion the court indicated that the sole test
of wholesomeness should be the product's "actual safety for human con-
sumption," the opinion does not make clear whether the court fully ap-
preciated the difference between the producer's actual or potential knowl-
edge as a factor in merchantability and his actual or potential knowledge
as a factor in liability flowing from an assumed want of merchantability.
To ignore the defendant's lack of knowledge seems sound so far as
it relates to a legal defect that has been established independently of the
product's design, as it does where food contains a foreign object or is con-
taminated with bacteria. But where a legal defect cannot be independ-
ently established, can the Florida court's "actual safety" test be taken as
disregarding the manufacturer's knowledge or opportunity for knowledge?
If we take the Green case as a guide, the answer seems to be that the
seller may be liable even though he knows nothing beyond the use to
which the product will be put. But is this case sound?
Certainly, an exclusive "actual safety" test would be too broad. In-
herently dangerous articles such as butcher knives, dynamite, and chain
saws can hardly be called "legally defective" merely because their use
carries a high incidence of harm.
The issue of knowledge has recently arisen in the drug industry.
75. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unfore-
seeable Risks on Manufacturers' Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 CoLrum. L. REV.
515 (1963).
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While the merits of Section 402A of the tentative Restatement of Torts,
Second, were being debated by the American Law Institute, legal repre-
sentatives of the drug industry were heard to complain that to impose
liability regardless of the industry's and the scientist's lack of knowledge
respecting the possibility of harm would greatly discourage the develop-
ment of new and needed drugs. On the other hand, the argument has
been made that not to impose liability would, in effect, give the drug in-
dustry "one free shot at the consumer," that is, a chance to exploit the
consumer, by using him as a test animal to define the risk. The issue
is not readily resolved, and I will not try to do so here."6 My main point
is that the idea of "legal defectiveness" provides an appropriate legal
arena in which to resolve the conflicts of social policy that may arise
between the interest in protecting reasonable consumer expectations re-
specting the performance of particular products and the interest in en-
couraging the development and marketing of needed products.7"
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc.," and companion cases in-
volving Salk vaccine might seem to be in point. In that case, the plaintiff
had been infected by live virus in Salk vaccine made by the defendant
under conditions in which the court assumed that it was impossible, in the
existing state of the art and with the procedures approved by the Food
and Drug Administration, to have foreseen its presence. Even so, the
court held the defendant liable.
However, the Gottsdanker case does not necessarily hold that the de-
fendant's opportunity for knowledge of the danger is irrelevant to the
issue of legal defectiveness. Because live virus, like a stone in a can of
beans, can easily be branded as a legal defect apart from the actual effects
that the vaccine has on particular users, the case can be said to decide,
like the Green case, only that once a defect has been independently estab-
lished the seller's want of knowledge of it is irrelevant. The product is
legally defective in such a case because the offending substance is both
abnormal and unwelcome. A disease-producing agent certainly does not
belong in a product whose only purpose is to prevent the disease. The
case, therefore, is distinguishable. Even so, an underlying issue of social
policy remains: As against the interest in encouraging the development
of needed products, does this kind of consumer expectation warrant
76. My own tentative, undocumented conclusion is that, with the availability of
products liability insurance, the burden of consumer protection in these situations is not
a serious deterrent to the development and marketing of desirable new products. Cf. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
77. In Oregon, the issue has been resolved in favor of the manufacturer. Lewis v.
Baker, - Ore. -, 413 P.2d 400 (1966); Cochran v. Brooke, - Ore. -, 409
P.2d 904 (1966).
78. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
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greater legal protection than the expectation that there will be no un-
happy side effects?
The cigarettes involved in the Green case present a related, but dif-
ferent, legal problem. It is not easy to conclude that cigarettes are legally
defective. For one thing, cigarettes are not smoked for the purpose of
preventing cancer. Also, the carcinogenic aspects of cigarettes, instead
of being occasional intruders or even attributable to the design charac-
teristics of a particular brand, apparently inhere in the product itself.
Here, we face the possibility of saying that cigarettes as such are legally
defective.
Would it be absurd to brand an entire product as legally defective?
If an entire brand, such as I-olden's beer,"9 could be legally defective
because it contained arsenic, why not an entire product? If the consumer
is generally ignorant of an inherent risk that he could avoid if properly
informed (such as carbon tetrachloride's tendency to injure or kill), it
makes sense to say that such a product is ipso facto defective unless it
carries an appropriate warning." Fortunately, because inherent risks are
more likely to be risks that are familiar also to the consumer, the problem
faced in the Green case is not likely to arise often and, when it does, it is
likely to be temporary. This should comfort the manufacturers of rotary
lawn mowers and chain saws.
We might even take the final step and suppose a situation in which
the very activity that the product is designed to serve is the real threat.
Suppose that it turns out that neither cigarettes nor tobacco as such cause
lung cancer and that the mere act of smoking-the exposure of the lungs
to smoke or heat from any source-is the actual cause."1  Should the
manufacturer of tobacco products have any responsibility if consumers
generally are unaware of the danger?
On the one hand, it might be argued that the product itself is not le-
gally defective because it does exactly what it is supposed to-produce
smoke. The product is beyond criticism in this respect. Such an ap-
proach would class tobacco with inherently dangerous articles, because
the activities that they serve are inherently dangerous.
On the other hand, it might be argued (1) that tobacco, at this stage
of consumer education, should not be classed with such products, because
the consumer is not yet fully alert to the dangers of smoking, and (2)
that we should treat tobacco as legally defective if it is unaccompanied by
an adequate warning.
79. Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K.B. 610.
80. E.g., Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
81. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1962).
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The difficulty in the Green case was that during the period in ques-
tion scientific knowledge had not yet developed to the point where a
warning would have been feasible. Or had it? What should the rule be
where the industry has a strong but scientifically unconfirmed suspicion
that cigarettes foster cancer? Assuming the uneducated consumer, does
the Green case mean that a manufacturer is liable unless he takes preven-
tive action that he could not possibly have taken, or that he is liable un-
less he gives a warning in which he shares his current doubts and suspi-
cions? The tenor of the opinion suggests the former. In the Pritclurd
case, on the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit suggested that a warning might be appropriate even where only
a suspicion exists.8 2
However we resolve the problem of the Green case, it would seem
safe to conclude that if the producer has actual knowledge of a signifi-
cant risk of which the consumer is ignorant, the former should be liable
to the injured consumer if (1) he fails to remove the offending condi-
tion, provide a safety device, or include effective instructions for use or
a warning, and (2) the consumer is injured as a result. This rule may
be the answer to the problems of swerving automobiles, overturning trac-
tors, and broken surgical pins.
Although this proposition seems conservative, even it may need an
exception. The point can be illustrated with the blood cases. It has been
said that "probably the most serious risk relating to blood transfusion
which defies medical science and preventive measures is the danger of
transmitting hepatitis. . . . [A] healthy person who has no history of
hepatitis or jaundice and no clinical evidence of liver disease may never-
theless carry the virus of hepatitis.""3 In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hos-
pital,84 the court held that the defendant was under no warranty obliga-
tion because the contract was one for services and thus not one for the
sale of blood. The situation is interesting because, on the one hand, the
defendant hospital was fully aware of the danger while, on the other, the
plaintiff was not. Even if the transaction is viewed as a sale, the result
can be rationalized on the ground that, in view of the far greater risks
arising from not having the blood transfusion, and in view of the un-
settling effect that the information might have had on the patient, a
warning to him not only would have been useless but might have been a
82. Id. at 300.
83. Hirsch, Responsibilities in Blood Transfusion, 1:2 MEDICOLEGAL DiGEST 21, 23
(1960).
84. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), criticized by Wade, supra note 2, at 20.
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positive detriment. Similarly for the Pasteur treatment for rabies.8"
However, a warning to the attending physician on behalf of the patient
might be an appropriate requirement in some cases.
Suppose that the manufacturer, through no fault, shares the con-
sumer's ignorance of a risk that scientists have discovered. Suppose, too,
that the risk is removable or that a useful warning or instruction would
be feasible. Either way, we can justify liability on the ground that it
provides the manufacturer a general incentive to keep abreast of scientific
knowledge and to act accordingly. With this objective, it makes sense to
impose liability on a defendant for failing to improve the performance
of his product or give a warning or an instruction even when he lacks the
knowledge necessary for doing either. Withouf the improvement or
warning, the product is legally defective. The courts seem to be willing
to go this far.
Suppose that at the time of sale the risk was unknown even to sci-
entists, but is known by the time of trial. The policy argument for impos-
ing liability in such a case is similar, except that the incentive here would
be not merely to keep abreast of existing scientific knowledge, but ac-
tively to foster scientific research. This assumes that the general class
of producers of which the defendant is a member is financially formid-
able. Faced with this problem in Lartigue v. R. I. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.,8" the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied re-
covery. It said that to recover the plaintiff must "show that the war-
ranted product contained an element from which, on the basis of existing
human knowledge, harm might be expected to flow.
' 87
The Lartigue case seems to stand for the general proposition that
strict liability should not be imposed unless the risk in question was
known, at the time of sale, at least to scientists.8 If this view is accepted,
it probably makes a significant difference, however, only where the in-
jury incurred is an undesirable side-effect, such as cancer, hepatitis, or
allergy. Here, the consumer has no affirmative expectation that the
manufacturer has directly undertaken to meet. Any assumption that
the use will result in no undesirable side effect normally is tacit and
85. Treatment may lead to serious permanent impairment, but this seems preferable
to an otherwise invariable and painful death. See Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind.
App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941), where both physician and patient were adequately
warned; RESTATFMNT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
86. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
87. Id. at 35.
88. "For strict liability to apply there must be foreseeability of harm .... [The
manufacturer] is an insurer against foreseeable risks-but not against unknowable risks."
Id. at 36, 37. See also Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Con-
nolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His Prod-
uct, 32 INs. CouNsEL- 1. 303 (1965).
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unconscious.
Where, on the other hand, injury results from a defect that frus-
trates normal, bargained-for performance, as with the Electras or Salk
vaccine, there is less reason to talk about strict tort liability and more rea-
son to talk about what in common expectation the seller has affirmatively
undertaken to deliver. Should not the law be stricter in such a case? In-
deed, even if we stay with strict tort liability as tempered by general fore-
seeability, is not every injury in such a case ipso facto "foreseeable" in
the sense used by the court?89
Let us take the final step and assume that scientific knowledge of
the risk is lacking even at the time of trial. Here, of course, unless the
courts are willing to change their current approach, the plaintiff will lose
simply because, without showing a definable threat to a known class, he
cannot hope to show that he is other than an idiosyncratic or the victim
of pure accident.
The law withholds protection from an idiosyncratic plaintiff when-
ever defectiveness can be established only by reference to the fact of the
plaintiff's injury.9" In such cases there is no definable class of plaintiffs
that producers or scientists could use, even in hindsight, as a basis for
prediction or otherwise to guard against future harm. Even a warning
or instruction would be not only impossible but inconceivable. In such
cases, the only policy reason for imposing liability would be some theory
that isolated, individual losses (as distinct from those resulting from
definable risks) should be shifted to enterprises capable of absorbing or
spreading them. No products liability case that I know of has gone so
far."' There has been much general talk about "risk spreading," but risk
spreading assumes a definable risk, a minimum degree of "typicality"9"
that provides the necessary actuarial basis for insurance. A definable
risk, in turn, assumes a class of victim definable by the time of trial at
the latest.
This explains, I think, the significant legal difference between the
89. The court (317 F.2d at 36 n.36) relied heavily on Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Cosunwr), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1143 (1960) : "A more
difficult problem is that of what Professor Ehrenzweig has called 'typicality' of the in-
jury. Put in more ordinary language, this means the foreseeability of the harm-the
seller's reasonable anticipation of it as a normal consequence of the consumption or use
of his product if it should turn out to be defective." The consequences of simple non-
performance are easier to foresee than the consequences of an unforeseeable side effect.
Although the specific defect in the Electras or in Salk vaccine was unforeseeable, gen-
eral failure of performance was not. In references to the "foreseeability" of something,
it is not always clear how general a category of risk is being referred to.
90. On hypersensitivity generally, see DIcKERso, op. cit. supra note 16, at 211-30.
91. At least one writer has suggested the possible desirability of so extending lia-
bility. James, supra note 2, at 1558.
92. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 1422, 1460 (1966).
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person who is allergic and the person who is merely idiosyncratic. The al-
lergy cases are often misunderstood because, although most of them can
be read as denying relief to persons who are allergic, many plaintiffs have
failed because they failed to show that they were members of identifiable
classes; that is, that they were other than idiosyncratics.93
To go farther than protecting identifiable classes would be to shift
the individual losses resulting from pure accidents, which are by defini-
tion unavoidable, unpredictable, and uninsurable. To base civil liability
solely on causation in fact would, it seems to me, go beyond the feasible
outer limits of strict liability. (Whether strict liability should go as far
as these outer limits is still being debated.)
A thoroughgoing system of "enterprise liability" based solely on
causation in fact, and thus uninhibited by considerations of remoteness
or otherwise, would be judicially unmanageable. Certainly it would make
no administrative sense when viewed alongside the alternative possibility
of a causation-free, governmentally administered system of accident in-
demnity. (The wisdom of so pervasive an approach is not in issue here.)
Even workmen's compensation is based on definable, and thus measur-
able, risks.
If this analysis is sound, what basis is there for looking at the state
of scientific knowledge as of the time of trial rather than the time of
sale, when the seller could more reliably determine the relevant costs?
The later date has the advantage of providing the maximum incentive to
advance scientific knowledge on behalf of the consumer without elimi-
nating the seller's opportunity, in future sales, to spread the costs of com-
pensation as figured from reasonably predictable factors. The argument
against it is that it encourages initiation of scientific research before the
specific risks that would give it direction are adequately defined. Which
view is persuasive would seem to depend on whether so diffuse an incen-
tive is materially effective. Determining the costs of the effort, on the
other hand, creates no serious problem. They could be spread even be-
fore any specific risk emerged, because it seems likely that the scope of
scientific inquiry would be defined by practical economic considerations,
without regard to the specifics of as yet undetermined risks.
Because the allergy cases are those closest to the vanishing point of
definable and legally treatable classes, it is interesting to consider the
allergy problem further.
93. E.g., Howard v. Avon Prod., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964). On al-
lergy generally, see DIcKERsoN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 215-230; FREnDMAN, ALLERGY
AND PRoDucTs LIABILITY (1961) ; Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability Today, 24
OHIO ST. L.J. 479 (1963).
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A commonly made objection to granting relief in cases where al-
lergy is proven is that the allergic person, like the idiosyncratic, is inher-
ently abnormal. The plaintiff, on the other hand, must ordinarily meet
the standards set for people in general. That is why we have such doc-
trines as contributory negligence.
But the problem is not so much one of abnormality as it is one of de-
finability and legal treatability."4 If a class of consumer that needs spe-
cial protection is both known and amenable to protection, why should the
law withhold relief merely because the great bulk of people do not fall
within it ? I assume here that the abnormality does not consist of sub-
standard, imprudent, or culpable conduct. The real problem in the al-
lergy cases, therefore, is not to contain abnormality, but to define what
can be done to protect the consumer. If the law can provide special pro-
tection for young children, why not for persons who are allergic?
The other policy objection to imposing liability for allergy harm
relates to the allergent that inheres in a natural, unprocessed product,
such as fresh strawberries marketed by a financially well-heeled grower.
Should such a grower be liable even to a member of a well-known class?
Certainly there is no offending ingredient that could be removed or
changed.
Strawberries, of course, are unlikely to cut a big figure in the arena
of products liability. The results are not severe, and most allergic con-
sumers are as fully aware of the risk as are the growers. Even so, let us
suppose that the results are severe and that the typical allergy sufferer is
unaware not only of his condition but that the product is potentially
harmful to him. Would it be appropriate to hold the producer or dis-
tributor in such a case?
Here it arguably makes sense to distinguish between what inheres in
a natural product and what is included by the manufacturer in a fabri-
cated one.9" Although this may smack of the now widely repudiated
"natural-foreign" test of legal defectiveness, a court might reasonably
94. In Ray v. J. C. Penney Co., 274 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1959), the following in-
struction was approved: "one who sells a product on the market, knowing that some
unknown few, not in an identifiable class which could be effectively warned, may suffer
allergic reactions or other isolated injuries not common to ordinary or normal persons,
need not respond in damages." (Emphasis added.)
95. "[T]here is a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn of potential dangers
from use even though the percentage of users is not large." Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal.
App. 2d 378, 395, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 193 (1964).
96. In Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 466, 162 A.2d 513,
516 (1960), the court distinguished "an article or product in its natural state" from a
manufactured product containing "a chemical or other substance." See also Keeton,
supra note 4, at 863, 866; Sedgwick, Conley, & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied
Warranties, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 139, 165 (1964).
330
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
hold that the defendant manufacturer is liable for harm caused by the
failure of his product to meet the reasonable expectations of a definable
class of consumers only if he made the product or otherwise helped to
create or inflate the expectations of those consumers with respect to that
contemplated use. Would it not make sense to condition legal defective-
ness and attendant liability at least in part on the defendant's participa-
tion, beyond merely selling the product, in fostering the consumer expec-
tations that his product disappointed? In the absence of express war-
ranty, this would absolve the producers and distributors of strawberries.
It might also absolve the sellers of trichinous pork.
On the other hand, such an approach would seem to be undermined
by the practicability of a warning. On balance, therefore, would it not
make better sense to impose liability even here?
CONCLUSION
If this analysis is sound, we may conclude, as a reasonable synthesis
of present-day trends, that a product is "legally defective" if it meets the
following conditions:
(1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a defin-
able class of consumer and the risk is ascertainable at least
by the time of trial.
(2) The risk is one that the typical member of the class does
not anticipate and guard against.97
(3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with
respect to a contemplated use and manner of use of the
product and a contemplated minimum level of perform-
ance.
(4) The seller has reason to know of the contemplated use and,
possibly where injurious side effects are involved, has rea-
sonable access to knowledge of the particular risk involved.
(5) The seller knowingly participates in creating the contem-
plated use, or in otherwise generating the relevant con-
sumer expectations, in the way attributed to him by the
consumer.
Specific issues of strict liability that remain unresolved can be set-
tled, compatibly with the established elements of legal doctrine and a fair
balancing of competing interests and expectations, by appropriately shap-
ing and refining the doctrine of product inadequacy that comprises the
97. The "natural-foreign" test, formally invoked by some courts (see note 6
supra), appears to be a perversion of this standard.
332 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
developing idea of "legal defect." Then we will know, even better than
we do today, "how good a product has to be."
